Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a special edition of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 27 January - 2 February 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

China Pressures Okinawan Independence Movement

Summary
On 25 January, The Telegraph reported that the CCP may be working with Chinese nationals on Okinawa to expand an independence movement and pressure U.S. military bases there. The CCP are also investing in a Ryukyu research center which will focus on diplomacy and investment to Okinawa.

Findings

• Background: On 16 June 2016, 60,000 Okinawans protested the U.S. military presence on the island and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. Marines. Due to its strategic location, Okinawa hosts nearly 30,000 of the 55,000 American military personnel in Japan — a statistic that has been parroted by Okinawans and Chinese agitators for years in order to sow discontent.
  The “Okinawa Problem” is also complicated by a long history of colonialism (by Japan and foreign powers) against indigenous Okinawans. A mostly peaceful history is often cited as a reason for kicking out U.S. forces and embracing China.

• Silent Invasion: On 25 January, The Telegraph reported an increase in propaganda and diplomatic coercion on Okinawa by Beijing. Reports suggest Chinese agents are sowing discord by highlighting economic issues, historical grievances, and American military presence on the island.
  The Telegraph also reports that ethnic Chinese living in Okinawa have been approached to help set up underground police stations.
  The Okinawan governor, Denny Tamaki, visited China in 2023 and called for closer ties with China in a Global Times article.

• Ryukyu Research Center: Dalian Maritime University in northern China is establishing the Ryukyu Research Center to “strengthen China’s claims” to Okinawa, a strategic pursuit that will likely see Beijing promote further protest and discord among Okinawans.

Why This Matters
Enough pressure from Okinawans — backed by CCP initiatives — could accelerate the U.S. military’s relocation from Okinawa. The Marine Corps has already moved 4,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Additionally, Chinese pressure indicates Okinawa as a future target for Chinese influence operations, economic investment, and social and political integration. In the long-term (think decades), a strong Okinawan independence movement could see the island break-away from Japan and align with China. If U.S. forces end up withdrawing from Okinawa entirely, it would be very likely that China would push to establish a presence there.

In the medium-term, China will continue to pressure the Okinawan independence movement as a means to minimize U.S. military operations on the island. In the event of a conflict with Taiwan, it is certain that China would strike various military facilities there, such as MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base, both of which host the bulk of Okinawan-based U.S. air assets.

Sources: The Telegraph, Rising Powers Initiative, Global Times

Exercise Cope North 25 To Begin In Marianas Islands

Summary
From 3-21 February, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces will host various allies for exercise Cope North 25 at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.

Findings

• Cope North: Beginning in 1978, Cope North is an annual exercise intended to enhance the integration and combat capability of U.S. and allied air forces. The exercise involves various partner nations, such as Japan and Australia. The exercise is typically focused on aviation operations, to include air support, antiair warfare, electronic warfare, aircraft and missile control, and force protection — all overseen by Command and Control (C2) agencies.

• Historic Iteration: During this iteration, it will be the first time American, Japanese, and Australian F-35 Lightning II fighters will train alongside one another. This year specifically, the focus is on conducting Combat Air Force/Large Force Employment (CAF/LE) as a means of improving fifth-generation aircraft interoperability.

Why This Matters
Cope North is a valuable opportunity to enhance joint training and integration with regional allied militaries. This iteration seems to have an emphasis on enhancing the U.S.-led alliance’s “soft power” due to the level of F-35 integration.

It will also help Guam and the supporting units stationed there rehearse large-scale operations. Guam is poised to have a significant role in a potential conflict between China and Taiwan due to it being the core position in the Second Island Chain.

Sources: Eurasia Times, Pacific Air Forces

Philippine President Offers To Remove U.S. Missiles In Bid To Deter, Limit Chinese Naval Aggressions

Summary
On 30 January, Filipino President Marcos offered to remove U.S. missiles if China would end its “aggressive and coercive behavior” in the South China Sea.

Findings

• U.S. Missiles: In April 2024, the United States deployed a Typhon missile system to the Philippines as a part of exercise Balikatan 24. The system is a long-range fires capability of the U.S. Army, and fires a modified version of the SM-6 missile.
  Beijing has repeatedly denounced the presence of the Typhon system’s deployment to the Philippines due to its ability to strike mainland China.

• Chinese Aggressions: China claims various Philippine territories in the South China Sea as its own. These claims are a part of an illegitimate doctrine known as the “9-Dash Line.” In 2021, China instituted a law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to use force to enforce Chinese sovereignty claims. In 2024, China significantly ramped up its coercive and aggressive policy of incursions against Philippine vessels operating in Filipino waters. A 26 January 2025 article by China Daily suggests China will expand its maritime operations and incursions under the pretext of the 2021 CCG law.

• Philippine Sovereignty: In November 2024, President Marcos signed a law that reaffirmed the Philippine’s control over its maritime territories, a decision that is backed by a 1982 UN Charter of the seas.

• Marcos’ Offer: Speaking to reporters, Marcos had this to say about China, its coercive military actions, and the deployment of U.S. Typhon missiles to the Philippines:

Why This Matters
The Philippine’s policy on China’s naval incursions and harassment of its civil and coast guard vessels has been to remain restrained, particularly around the contested Second Thomas Shoal.

Marcos’ offer, while a seemingly off-the-cuff remark to reporters, is the first serious diplomatic pushback to Beijing’s actions. It is also a clever offer by Marcos, as China absolutely does not want the Typhon system in the Philippines, but it would require the PLA and Chinese Coast Guard to comply with international law and Philippine sovereignty.

So far, Xi has rebuked Marcos’ offer. On 1 February 2025, the Global Times reported that the PLA’s Southern Theater Command, alongside the Chinese Coast Guard, were patrolling around the Scarborough Shoal (AKA Huangyan Dao). The Southern Theater Command stated the PLA Navy and CCG patrols were a continuation of the “law enforcement” and “safeguarding national territorial sovereignty” operations that increased in January.

Sources: Newsweek, France 24, South China Morning Post, China Daily, Global Times

Hegseth Speaks With Japanese Counterparts, Commits To Expanding U.S.-Japanese Partnership

Summary
On 31 January, the Department of Defense released a readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s call with the Japanese Minister of Defense. The two discussed the expansion of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.

Findings

• Readout: One of Hegseth’s first calls to a foreign counterpart was to Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen. The pair discussed how they can grow the existing bilateral defense partnership in pursuit of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region.”
  Specifically, the pair discussed expanding bilateral command and control.

• Details: An article by The Japan Times reported that Hegseth confirmed to Nakatani that Japan’s uninhabited islands (west of Okinawa), such as the Senkakus, are included in the U.S.-Japanese Defense Treaty. Additionally, both ministers agreed to expand the U.S.-Japan Command and Control framework which includes a new joint military force headquarters.

Why This Matters
Hegseth’s call — and the commitments he offered his Japanese counterpart — are hugely important clarifications to America’s position and intentions in the Pacific. Under the Biden administration, the DOD’s role in responding to China was ambiguous. Even more so, that ambiguity trickled down to restrict certain U.S. operations on certain Japanese territories — in this case, the Senakakus (which China lays claim to).

Now, Hegseth’s commitment to expanding coordination with American and Japanese commanders, in addition to U.S. forces having a growing presence closer to Taiwan, the alliance is firmly anti-CCP and anti-PLA. In my opinion, it is only a matter of time before Hegseth gets grilled on Taiwan and clarifies the U.S. policy — that we will intervene to defend the island against China.

The timing of this is also critical, as high-level Chinese and Japanese officials recently conducted a rare week-long diplomatic exchange in an effort to improve relations and offer clarity on security actions and objectives in the region.

Sources: The Japan Times, U.S. Department of Defense

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thanks for reading and enjoy the rest of your Sunday.

See you tomorrow,

Nick