Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a special edition of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 10-16 February 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

China Restricts Access To Military News, Updates

Summary
On 9 February, the CCP published guidance regarding what information about military activities and personnel can be published online. The effort is designed to conceal military activity and restrict access to the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.

Findings

• Issued Notice: On 9 February, the CCP’s National Administration of State Secrets Protection issued a notice to regulatory agencies, communications organizations, and government departments.
  Military and Political Affairs notice number 26 implements new guidance on “the Dissemination of Military Information on the Internet.”

• Controls: The changes control what information regarding military personnel and activities can be published on the internet. Its goal, in a nutshell, is to ensure posted information:

• Implementation: Nikkei Asia reports that the new changes will go into effect on 1 March 2025.

Why This Matters
In the United States, we call this Operational Security (OPSEC) and it is critical to the tactical, operational, and strategic success of our work. In China’s case, Beijing is intent on stopping leaks regarding PLA operations, plans, and developing capabilities.

Perhaps this is more significant given our narrowing proximity to 2027 (the year Xi Jinping desires the PLA to invade Taiwan), as it could indicate China has new capabilities or strategies it wishes to rehearse and carry out.

Additionally, restricting this type of information — especially related to personnel and weapons systems — makes it more difficult for adversary intelligence collection. The logic is also consistent with the theories of Sun Tzu, who CCP and PLA elites view as a core influence to Chinese strategy, doctrine, and culture:

Sources: CNN, Nikkei Asia, Policy and Regulations Department (CCP)

Japan Tests Ballistic Missile, Signs Major Arms Deal With United States

Summary
The U.S. has approved a $900 million arms sale to Japan. It includes missiles and launchers for air defense. Prior to the deal, Japan announced it had conducted various tests for a new ballistic missile throughout 2024. The tests took place in California.

Findings

• Ballistic Missile Test: On 7 February, Japan’s Defense Ministry announced that it had domestically developed the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and conducted tests in California from August 2024 to January 2024.

• Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile: Newsweek reports, citing Japanese media, that the projectile uses a hypersonic glid vehicle as its warhead, making it capable of evading air defense systems.
  Specifications:

  • Speed: Mach 5

  • Range: 310-621 miles

  • Role: Long-range fires, standoff defense

• U.S.-Japanese Arms Deal: The Trump administration approved a $900 million missile sale to Japan to improve its standoff defense capability. Here is what it includes:

  • 150 Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block I’s (i.e. the projectile)

  • MK 21 Mod 3 Vertical Launch System (VLS) canisters (i.e. the launcher)

  • Component parts and equipment, engineering support

  • Integration and Test services

  • Training products and aids

  • Technical publications and data

  The purchase is intended to supplement the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) AEGIS Weapon System (AWS).

Why This Matters
Japan’s recent tests and missile acquisitions are a good sign for the strengthening of Japanese defense forces in addition to being a good indicator of strong relations between Tokyo and Washington under the new administration.

Japan’s investiture in missile technology and munitions extends its offensive and defensive capabilities. It also sets the groundwork for missiles like the SM-6 to be manufactured domestically in Japan, thereby extending the U.S. supply chain which will be critical in future conflicts in the region.

Sources: Newsweek, MSN, DCSA

Taiwanese Legislature Approves Defense Budget Cuts, Lai Calls For Special Budget

Summary
On 10 February, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan approved $6 billion in budget cuts which are aimed at the military. Following the vote, and Trump’s tariff threats, President Lai has announced his intent to establish a special budget raising the nation’s defense spending to 3% of its GDP.

Findings

• Legislative Yuan: On 10 February SDPB reported that Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan, approved a $6 billion cut from President Lai Ching-te’s proposed defense budget. The cuts are aimed at the Taiwanese military and purchases of U.S. military equipment.

• President Lai: Following the Legislative Yuan’s vote, and President Trump’s tariff threats, President Lai announced on 15 February that he is proposing a special budget to raise the nation’s defense spending to 3% of its GDP.
  The move reflects Taiwan’s desire to supplement its defenses in the face of an increasingly aggressive China. It also reflects Lai’s desire to reduce the trade deficit with the U.S.

• Previous Aid: The Taipei Times reports that in the last 8 years, the U.S. has approved $26.26 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. $18.76 billion of that came from Trump’s first administration, between 2017 and 2021.
  

Why This Matters
In Pacific Weekly #35, I discussed the importance of Taiwan’s budget cuts as they relate to a possible conflict with Taiwan. Those reasons remain constant.

The budget cuts are a serious risk to Taiwan due to the possibility of conflict with China in 2027.

Before the budget cuts were approved, Premier Cho Jung-tai stated 5 ways in which they would harm Taiwan:

• Weaken Taiwan’s economic competitiveness

• Weaken national defense by slowing the growth of capabilities

• Slows investment into technological development

• Diminishes funding for public services and projects

• Restricts government communication channels with the public

From a defense perspective, the cuts hamper Taiwan’s ability to invest in and expand projects that would help the island deter a PLA invasion.

From a political perspective, the cuts to administrative and cross-strait-associated agencies reduce Taipei’s ability to resist CCP narratives regarding sovereignty over the island or the nature of Beijing’s cause.

The incident, overall, reflects the KMT’s growing sympathy and affinity for the CCP as it tries to find itself in leadership positions again. A 15 January 2025 article by the Council on Foreign Relations suggests that “The KMT opposes Taiwan’s independence and has consistently called for closer ties with Beijing,” an assessment that is supported by the deterioration of the Cross-Strait relationship following the DPP’s control of Taiwan since 2016.

However, President Lai has done a clever thing by proposing a special budget to enhance defense spending. Mind you, he is doing this as more than a dozen KMT legislators are due for voter recalls, meaning they could be thrown from office this year and lead to a DPP-controlled Legislative Yuan. In the “best case” scenario for Taiwan, this means a special budget being approved and a possible reversal of budget cuts.

Regardless of what happens, Taiwan still requires foreign support, which will largely come from the United States. This means Lai will have to craft some clever deals with Trump and his team if he wants the best possible backing from Washington.

Sources: SDPB, Taipei Times, The Intel Brief

U.S. Navy Ships Transit Taiwan Strait

Summary
From 10-12 February, the U.S. conducted maneuvers which included transiting the Taiwan Strait. All maneuvers were conducted in international waters. The PLA denounced the transit, calling it an escalation and security risk.

Findings

• Trump’s Indo-Pacific Policy: The U.S. Navy vessels that transited the strait were the first to do so under Trump’s administration, indicating an intent to oppose China and defend Taiwan and U.S. regional allies.

• Transit: The Japan Times reports that two U.S. Navy vessels transited the Taiwan Strait from “Monday to Wednesday” (i.e. 10-12 February).
  The vessels were the USS Ralph Johnson and USS Bowditch.
  The transit occurred between “any coastal state’s territorial seas” and "it was in accordance with “high-seas freedom of navigation, overflight and other internationally lawful uses.”

• China’s Response: The PLA deployed naval and air forces to monitor the passage. A spokesperson for the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command said the transit “sent the wrong signals and increased security risks.”

Why This Matters
The U.S. Navy vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait offer U.S. regional allies (particularly Taiwan) some clarity on Trump’s Indo-Pacific Policy. The U.S. has conducted routine transits of the strait for years, citing its commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and that it will continue such patrols so long as international law allows for it.

The patrol may seem like a small and insignificant military action, but it is a signal from Trump’s administration that while tariffs and harsh diplomatic tones may be making headlines and generating controversy, the United States backs its allies and intends to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty from CCP aggressions.

Sources: The Japan Times, Reuters

Report: Chinese Increased U.S.-Based Espionage During Biden Administration

Summary
On 12 February, The Daily Wire published an exclusive report regarding Chinese espionage activity in the U.S. over the past 4 years.

Findings

• Report: The House Homeland Security Committee reported an increase in Chinese espionage activity during the Biden administration. The committee documented over 60 cases of Chinese espionage, with activities including:

  • Stealing military secrets

  • Stealing trade information

  • Conducting transnational repression operations (against the Chinese diaspora)

Why This Matters
Chinese espionage poses a significant threat to national security, economic stability, and technological competitiveness. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs a vast network of intelligence operatives, cyber units, and corporate insiders to steal military secrets, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and proprietary innovations. This multifaceted approach undermines U.S. and allied defense capabilities while advancing China's military modernization at a fraction of the cost and time required for legitimate research and development.

Beyond military concerns, China's economic espionage has inflicted severe damage on industries ranging from semiconductors to biotechnology. State-sponsored hacking groups and coerced technology transfers through joint ventures allow China to leapfrog technological barriers, threatening the dominance of Western companies. The theft of trade secrets not only results in financial losses but also weakens long-term innovation, as companies struggle to compete with subsidized Chinese firms using stolen research.

The broader geopolitical implications of Chinese espionage extend to strategic influence operations. By targeting government officials, academic institutions, and media organizations, China manipulates policy discussions, shapes narratives favorable to Beijing, and coerces critics into self-censorship. This undermines democratic institutions and weakens the resilience of free societies against authoritarian influence. In the long run, unchecked Chinese espionage erodes the security and economic leadership of the U.S. and its allies, tilting the global balance of power in favor of an increasingly assertive China.

The truth is that Chinese espionage is a major policy concern due to the myriad risks it poses. If you want to read more about it, I have two book recommendations:

• On a strategic level, read The Hundred Year Marathon by Michael Pillsbury

• For a greater tactical understanding, read Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics by Nicholas Eftimiades

Sources: House Committee on Homeland Security, Daily Wire

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

What do you think of the Trump administration’s apparent Indo-Pacific policy and stance on Taiwan? Let me know: [email protected] 

Enjoy your Sunday,

Nick