Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a special edition of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 7-13 April 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

China Set To Formally Ban Missionary Activity, Promote Xi’s Chinese Buddhism

Summary
The Christian watchdog organization Persecution, citing reporting by Chinese state media, states that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will impose restrictions on missionary activity throughout China. The new regulations take effect on 1 May. This development supports a previous estimate that Xi Jinping would continue using religion as a tool of national power.

Findings

• Regulations: Beginning on 1 May, foreigners will be banned from preaching, sharing faith, and establishing religious organizations in China. To do so, missionaries will need CCP approval. All Christian organizations will be confined to state-run churches, such as the CCP-linked Three Self Church and Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.

• Spring Rain Project: A February 2025 article by Global Times reported that China’s Ministry of Public Security coordinated with Chinese security officials in 2024 to “dismantle cult organizations.”
  On the back end of police raids, CCP personnel have launched the “Spring Rain Project” in rural China, a psychological and educational program intended to deter Chinese nationals from approaching ideologies, institutions, and faiths deemed cultist and unlawful, especially Christian organizations.
  The Global Times report indicated that 56,000 events related to the project reached more than 17 million rural Chinese in 2024.

• Logic: Chinese state media stated the decision is to protect national security by protecting “normal religious activity.” The CCP views uncontrolled and foreign religion as conflicting with CCP ideology and loyalty.

• Chinese Buddhism Reform: In August 2024, Bitter Winter reported that the CCP’s China Buddhist Association — run by the United Front — had begun a “humanistic” reform and “Sinicization” of Chinese Buddhism. The reform, which involves state control of Buddhist officials, texts, and institutions, also included the integration of “Xi Jinping Thought” into Buddhist teachings.

Why This Matters
The formal ban on missionary activity and the expansion of CCP-led religious reform reflect a broader strategy by Xi Jinping to consolidate ideological control and fuse nationalism with state-sanctioned spirituality. By eliminating independent religious influences—especially those with foreign ties like Christianity—Xi strengthens the CCP’s monopoly on identity, loyalty, and values. This control reduces the potential for organized dissent, particularly in rural or minority areas where underground churches and foreign missionaries have historically gained traction.

The promotion of a Sinicized “Chinese Buddhism,” infused with “Xi Jinping Thought,” mirrors efforts seen under Mao: religion becomes a political tool, reinforcing CCP authority rather than offering alternative sources of belief or allegiance. This has advantages for regime stability and social cohesion under authoritarian terms, but it also deepens cultural repression and alienates millions of believers. Long-term, this risks driving faith-based movements further underground, intensifying international criticism, and worsening human rights conditions. It may also sharpen ideological fault lines with democratic nations, complicating diplomatic and trade relationships, especially with countries invested in religious freedom and human rights.

On X, some users have discussed how Chinese Christianity was used to mobilize U.S. support for China during World War II despite its official isolationist stance.

It is possible, under similar logic, that Xi and the CCP fear a Christian diaspora could be mobilized against the CCP during wartime, or as a means of inducing social and political crisis across China.

Sources: Persecution, Global Times, The Intel Brief

Taiwan Launches Large-Scale Exercise Following Chinese Drills

Summary
On 5 April, Taiwan launched its annual Han Kuang military exercise amid growing fears that recent large-scale drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could quickly escalate into a real invasion. The Han Kuang exercise emphasizes countering China’s “gray zone” tactics and strengthening Taiwan’s joint defense posture. The exercise was preceded by PLA operations around the island, including simulated strikes, air superiority drills, and naval blockades.

Findings

• PLA Joint Drills: The PLA’s latest exercise (Strait Thunder-2025A) involved coordinated operations across its navy, air, rocket, and ground forces, simulating strikes on critical infrastructure and rehearsing port blockades. Analysts noted the PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and strike key targets with minimal notice.

• Exercise Huan Kuang: On 5 April, Taiwan’s military began the 40th iteration of its Han Kuang drills. This year’s exercise spans 14 days, followed by live-fire operations in July. The focus includes defending against amphibious landings, countering electronic warfare, and rehearsing mobilization of civil and military units in the event of crisis.

• Necessity: According to Taiwanese defense officials and analysts, the scale and proximity of the PLA’s activities are part of a deliberate pressure campaign. Some warn that Beijing may use such drills as cover for actual hostilities, reducing the time Taiwan and its allies have to respond.

Why This Matters
The convergence of Chinese and Taiwanese military activities in early April 2025 highlights two possibilities:

• The growing risk of miscalculation or

• Intentional escalation in the Taiwan Strait by China

The PLA’s evolving capability to execute joint operations at short notice raises serious implications for regional security and operational planning for the U.S.-led alliance in the Indo-Pacific. If China were to mask an invasion as a drill, the time available for U.S. or allied intervention could be critically short. These developments underscore the strategic need for improved early warning, regional coordination, and credible deterrence to maintain the status quo and prevent a cross-strait conflict.

While evidence suggests China will continue to rapidly develop the PLA and its capabilities in order to successfully invade, seize, and control Taiwan, the CCP desires to continue “gray zone” operations to pressure a diplomatic solution or integration in the long term. However, this estimate also suggests China is looking for a “ripe” opportunity to begin a kinetic seizure of the island.

Sources: Taipei Times, Anadolu Agency, South China Morning Post, UK House of Commons

U.S., Philippine Marines Conduct Coastal Defense Drills

Summary
From 1-8 April, the U.S. Marine Corps participated in Marine Exercise (MAREX) with Philippine counterparts. The exercise is a part of the annual Balikatan exercise and included drills that enhance expeditionary and anti-ship operations.

Findings

• Coastal Defense Drills: From 1 to 8 April, U.S. and Philippine Marines conducted joint coastal defense drills as part of the annual Balikatan exercises. These operations took place in northern and western regions of the Philippines, particularly those facing the South China Sea. The drills emphasized ship-to-shore movement, defensive coordination, and artillery support in response to simulated amphibious invasions.

• Live-Fire Drills: Troops employed High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and other mobile artillery platforms during coastal defense scenarios. These exercises tested the rapid deployment of forces to protect shorelines from maritime threats. It also refines the U.S. Marine Corps’ ability to conduct expeditionary anti-ship operations.

Why This Matters
These coastal defense drills represent a significant evolution in the U.S.-Philippines defense partnership, reinforcing the credibility of the U.S. forward presence in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening the regional alliance aimed at deterring China. From a U.S. national security perspective, this training directly supports the ability to rapidly project power across the first island chain. By rehearsing joint responses to amphibious threats in littoral environments, both forces enhance their operational readiness for real-world contingencies, including a potential Taiwan conflict or maritime standoff in the South China Sea.

The drills reflect a broader U.S. strategic shift toward a more agile, distributed force posture in the region, consistent with U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept.

For the wider U.S.-led alliance network in the Pacific, these developments tighten coordination with regional partners like Japan and Australia and reinforce collective deterrence. As the Philippines continues to expand its defense cooperation with the U.S., it adds strategic depth to the alliance architecture and complicates China’s efforts to fracture regional security ties. The increased frequency and complexity of these drills also normalize a more visible U.S. military role in Southeast Asia, strengthening deterrence while building momentum for integrated multilateral defense planning in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness.

Sources: USNI News

Japan Launches Amphibious Transportation Unit

Summary
Japan announced the activation of a new regiment in the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB). The new unit stand-up also coincides with the establishment of a new EW unit and an anti-ship unit deployment to Okinawa.

Findings

• Activation of the 3rd Regiment: On 1 April, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) officially activated the 3rd Regiment of its Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) at Camp Takematsu in Nagasaki. The ARDB now includes three regiments, a brigade HQ, and support units—totaling about 3,300 personnel. This unit improves Japan’s ability to quickly deploy to remote southwest islands around Okinawa.

  • Supporting Deployments: Concurrently, Japan established an electronic warfare unit on Yonaguni Island and a surface-to-ship missile unit on Okinawa. This marks the first deployment of a surface-to-ship missile unit on Okinawa.

Why This Matters
Japan’s activation of the 3rd Regiment of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade represents a significant evolution in its defense posture—one that directly supports the strategic interests of the U.S.-led alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

These developments enhance the alliance’s ability to respond rapidly to crises, especially in the Southwest Islands and surrounding waters where Chinese maritime activity has intensified. The Senkaku Islands, claimed by both Japan and China, are a flashpoint for potential confrontation. By forward-deploying missile and electronic warfare assets to Okinawa and Yonaguni, Japan signals a growing willingness to counter China’s coercive behavior and defend its territorial sovereignty.

For the United States, a stronger, more proactive Japan serves as a force multiplier. The ARDB’s ability to conduct joint operations with U.S. Marines and allied forces bolsters regional deterrence and ensures greater interoperability. This is especially crucial as Washington and its partners seek to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific amid China’s military modernization and assertiveness.

Additionally, Japan’s push to harden infrastructure and expand its military footprint in Okinawa increases the resilience of allied forces in the event of conflict. As tensions rise over Taiwan and in the East China Sea, Japan’s enhanced readiness and regional presence serve as both a strategic hedge and a signal of alliance solidarity against unilateral changes to the status quo.

Sources: USNI News

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

What do you think about these developments? Let me know @ [email protected]

Enjoy your Sunday,

Nick