Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a special edition of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 6-12 January 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Taiwan Suspects China Of Undersea Cable Sabotage

Summary
On 5 January, Taipei Times reported that the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and Chunghwa Telecom confirmed an undersea internet cable. The CGA intercepted a Chinese vessel, registered in Cameroon, due to it being in the vicinity of the cable at the time of disruption.

Findings

• CGA Intercept: Taiwanese personnel intercepted the Shunxin-39 seven nautical miles North of Yehliu (northern Taiwan). CGA personnel did not board the vessel but asked it to return to Keelung Harbor for investigation. The Shunxin-39 did not comply with the request, instead sailing to South Korea.

• Disruption: Chunghwa Telecom officials said the damage to the cable did not result in a loss of telecommunications services due to back up infrastructure. A senior official stated such incidents are why Taiwan is pursuing a medium Earth-orbit satellite; to enhance its communications resilience.

• Sabotage: On 31 December 2024, before the undersea cable was cut, the Shunxin-39 shut off its Automatic Identification System (AIS), a system that transmits a vessels name, class, and location to maritime authorities, observers, and other vessels. Its last known location was in the vicinity of the cable before the disruption.
  Nearing the end of 2024, a Chinese vessel cut and undersea cable in the Baltic Sea. Russian vessels have since cut two more.

Why This Matters
The suspected sabotage of Taiwan's undersea internet cable by a vessel linked to China highlights the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in modern geopolitical conflicts. It highlights the growing range of hybrid warfare opportunities and the strategic importance of protecting global communications networks, vital for military, economic, and international stability.

The use of gray-zone tactics, like registering the ship as Cameroonian, demonstrates China’s ability to destabilize the region while maintaining plausible deniability, challenging traditional deterrence frameworks. The incident emphasizes the need for enhanced resilience, such as satellite-based systems, and collaborative international efforts to secure undersea infrastructure against future threats.

Finally, it also demonstrates how new, modern warfighting functions may be integrated into China’s capabilities. It is likely that these types of operations will continue in our current heightened security environment. It is certain that these operations will be conducted at the outset of a kinetic conflict, such as an invasion of Taiwan.

Sources: Taipei Times, The Guardian

Taiwanese Official, YouTube Personalities Report On CCP Influence Campaign

Summary
On 7 January, Taipei Times reported that rapper Chen Po-yuan and YouTuber Pa Chiung had posted a video exposing China’s efforts to coerce Taiwanese citizens through United Front efforts. An unnamed Taiwanese official also warned of these efforts.

Findings

• Background: China’s United Front is a strategic influence operation made up of CCP-affiliated organizations and personnel. The United Front frequently conducts influence campaigns or espionage activities abroad and in collaboration with the Chinese diaspora.

• The Coercion: In a YouTube documentary, Pa Chiung and Chen Po-yuan claim the United Front is attempting to get Taiwanese citizens to establish businesses in China, take out Chinese loans, and apply for Chinese citizenship. The pair allege, through CCP documents, that the United Front will pay upwards of 5 million yuan to recruit businesses or relocation to Fujian, China.
  The anonymous Taiwanese official states these efforts are designed to give China the pretext, over time, to intervene in Taiwanese affairs.

Why This Matters
China’s United Front coercion campaign in Taiwan illustrates how influence operations can undermine national sovereignty and create a pretext for continued aggression or military intervention.

For US national security, this raises concerns about Beijing’s long-term strategy to erode Taiwan’s autonomy through economic, social, and political integration efforts. By incentivizing Taiwanese citizens to establish ties with China, the CCP could fabricate a narrative of unification, providing justification for military intervention under the guise of protecting “Chinese citizens” in Taiwan.

• Casus Belli: This is a Latin phrase meaning “occasion for war.” In IR theory, it is the basis for the Just War concept. In the case of the United Front coercion, China could be pursuing this policy to slowly develop evidence of Taiwanese-Chinese integration; that in an economic and social sense, the “One China” already exists. This pretext could be used by China to justify military intervention against a “separatist” regime in Taipei, with China claiming that it is liberating Taiwanese citizens from a false government.
  Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Putin orchestrated a large-scale “passport diplomacy” campaign in Ukraine’s eastern oblasts to similar effects.

Sources: Taipei Times, YouTube

Taiwan Reports That Chinese Cyberattacks Doubled In 2024

Summary
On 6 January, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) claimed that China’s cyberattacks against Taiwanese government departments doubled in 2024 from 2023. The NSB views the cyberattacks as one piece of China’s “gray-zone harassment” strategy, which has included daily and naval military incursions.

Findings
The People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force (PLACF) was established in April 2024 following the break-up of the PLA Strategic Support Force. It is very likely that China’s 2024 cyberwarfare operations were conducted by the PLACF or by state-sponsored hacker groups.

• Cyberattacks: The Government Service Network (GSN) claims that China spent $2.4 million daily on cyberwarfare operations in 2024. This only includes operations on Taiwanese government agencies, and not major cyberattacks against the US, for example.

• Operational Support: The GSN said some of China’s cyberattacks coincide with traditional military drills around Taiwan. These include Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks which overload a targeted system with access requests or traffic. Such attacks support conventional military operations by dispersing resources, time, and attention to resolving or mitigating their effects in addition to shutting down key systems, such as digital communications.

• Intimidation: The GSN stated that some attacks also targeted individual government employees as a means of stealing personal information. Additionally, by targeting individual government employees, the CCP is hoping to intimidate and deter personnel who will be on the support-side of military operations in a defense of Taiwan.

• Intelligence: Some of the attacks attempted to establish back-door access into Taiwanese systems, giving them an effective means to collect political, military, and economic intelligence. Certain access could also give the CCP the ability to shut down Taiwanese systems at the outset of conflict.

Why This Matters
The doubling of Chinese cyberattacks against Taiwan in 2024 highlights the growing sophistication and intensity of China's gray-zone strategy, blending cyberwarfare with traditional military operations. This highlights the growing advantage of employing these tactics due to their effects: force support, disrupt critical systems, slow enemy decisionmaking and coordination, gather intelligence, and intimidate personnel. Such capabilities and effects potentially cripple a targets defense capabilities during a crisis.

This escalation has broader implications for international relations, as it reflects China's intent to exploit vulnerabilities in an interconnected digital landscape to assert dominance without direct military conflict. The establishment of the People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force (PLACF) signals a more organized and aggressive approach to cyberwarfare, which could be replicated against other US allies or systems.

Finally, the incident also highlights a new priority in national security: Ensuring preparedness against hybrid threats that blur the line between peace and conflict.

Sources: VOA, Reuters

Xi To Launch New Anti-Corruption Campaign, Purges

Summary
On 6 January, Xi Jinping addressed attendees at a three-day plenary session in Beijing. At the meeting, Xi stated corruption is “the biggest threat” to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that he will continue to “purify” the party.

Findings

• Xi’ Purges: In 2012, Xi began his tenure with sweeping purges of CCP and PLA personnel in an effort to control CCP ideology and unify strategic efforts in line with “Xi’ism.”

• Corruption: Xi is determined to crack down on CCP corruption due to perceived risks to his regime and strategy for China. Xi’s ultimate fears are that factionalism within the party could grow, oust Xi, disagree on ideology, or clash on policy. Given some of Xi’s ambitions — such as the forceful seizure of Taiwan — he cannot risk operating with a less than unified ruling elite.
  Professor Wedeman at Georgia State University suggests this will be an endless challenge for Xi due to the “pool Xi is drawing on to replace corrupt officials is also full of corrupt officials.”

Why This Matters
Continued purges suggest that Xi Jinping and the CCP may not wield the level of efficiency, power, or control over their government and society that Chinese media and officials often portray. This is not to say they lack authority or legitimacy, but that they might be experiencing more pushback than we know.

Even in top-down authoritarian systems, public trust, support, and confidence in leadership, institutions, and decision-making are crucial for stability. If corruption is a persistent issue within China, it could undermine this foundation, potentially leading to challenges such as low morale, political dissent, or social unrest during times of crisis or conflict.

Sources: Newsweek, Asia Times

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thanks for reading, I’ll see you tomorrow!

Enjoy your Sunday,

Nick